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Devolution, State Restructuring and Policy Divergence in the 
United Kingdom (UK) 
Abstract 
Devolution has become a key ‘global trend’ over recent decades as many states have 
decentralised power to sub-state governments. The United Kingdom (UK) resisted this trend 
until the late 1990s when devolution was enacted by the then Labour government, taking a 
highly asymmetrical form in which different territories have been granted different powers 
and institutional arrangements. Devolution allows the devolved governments to develop 
policies that are tailored to the needs of their areas, encouraging policy divergence, although 
this is countered by pressures to ensure that devolved approaches do not contradict those of 
the central state, promoting convergence. The paper aims to assess the unfolding dynamics of 
devolution and policy divergence in the UK. It is designed as an overview paper that spans 
different policy areas such as economic development, health and social policy. The paper 
emphasises that devolution has altered the institutional landscape of public policy in the UK, 
generating some high-profile examples of policy divergence, whilst also providing evidence 
of policy convergence. In addition, the passage of time underlines the nature of UK 
devolution as an unfolding process. Its underlying asymmetries have become more 
pronounced as the tendency towards greater autonomy for Scotland and Wales clashes with a 
highly centralised mode of policy-making in Westminster, the consequences of which have 
spilt over into the devolved territories in the context of the post-2007 economic crisis through 
public expenditure cuts. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the 1970s, a number of governments across the world have sought to transfer power to 
sub-state governments, meaning that devolution has become a key ‘global trend’ (Rodriguez- 
Pose and Gill 2003). Long regarded as a stable and centralised political unit, the United 
Kingdom (UK) state resisted the devolutionary trend until the late 1990s when devolution 
was enacted by the then Labour government. Labour’s approach was effectively to offer 
‘devolution on demand’, resulting in a highly asymmetrical form of devolution where 
different territories have been granted different powers and institutional arrangements (see 
Hazell 2000). Scotland has an elected parliament that has primary legislative competence 
over most ‘domestic’ policy issues; Northern Ireland has an elected, power-sharing assembly 
that also has wide-ranging legislative competence; and Wales has an elected assembly which 
has been granted legislative powers following a referendum in 2011. In the rest of England 
outside London, where an elected mayor and assembly were established, there was only 
limited administrative reform manifested through the creation of Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) and unelected Regional Assemblies which have subsequently been 
abolished by the Conservative-Liberal Democratic Coalition Government. As this indicates, 
UK devolution is a process rather than an event with the asymmetries between the so-called 
‘Celtic fringe’ of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, on the one hand, and England, on the 
other, becoming more pronounced over time (Shaw and Mackinnon 2011). 
 
Devolution has important repercussions for public policy, as a number of comparative studies 
attest (Greer 2007; Jeffery 2007; Keating 2009). It grants the devolved governments the capacity 
to develop policies that are better tailored to the economic and social conditions of their areas, 
encouraging policy divergence through the introduction of ‘local solutions to local problems’ 
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(Jeffery 2002). Moreover, devolution creates a logic of inter-territorial comparison and 
competition, potentially resulting in policy learning and transfer as the different administrations 
monitor developments elsewhere, adopting successful or popular policies from other jurisdictions 
(McEwen 2005). At the same time, the scope for policy innovation and transfer is often limited 
by pressures to ensure that measures adopted by devolved administrations do not contradict those 
of the central state, encouraging policy convergence (Shaw et al. 2009). 
 
The UK model of devolution is based upon a separation of powers between the UK 
parliament and the devolved parliaments (Keating 2002). This grants considerable latitude to 
the devolved governments to develop distinctive policies (Greer 2007) in devolved spheres of 
policy, while the central UK state retains the power to maintain common state-wide policies 
in reserved areas. At the same time, the devolved parliaments in the UK have limited 
revenue-raising powers. This has meant that the introduction of austerity measures designed 
to address the UK’s budget deficit by the Coalition Government since 2010 has had 
significant implications for the devolved governments, reducing their budgets and requiring 
them to administer cuts locally, although they have been vocal in their opposition to austerity 
and support of alternative policy approaches such as increased capital expenditure (McEwen 
2013; Salmond 2012). 
 
The paper aims to assess the unfolding dynamics of devolution and policy divergence and 
convergence in the run up to the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. It is designed as 
an overview paper that spans different policy areas such as economic development, health 
and social policy, rather than as a case study of developments in one particular area, drawing 
upon insights from the academic literature and key policy documents. It seeks to place the 
UK experience in a wider comparative context, drawing upon the international literature on 
devolution and territorial politics and bringing together insights from geography and political 
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science. The paper argues that devolution has altered the institutional landscape of public 
policy in the UK, generating some high-profile examples of policy divergence, whilst also 
providing evidence of policy convergence. In addition, it emphasises the nature of UK 
devolution as an unfolding process. The paper is structured in four main parts. The next 
section provides a theoretical and comparative perspective on devolution. This is followed by 
an account of UK devolution which emphasises the changed political and economic context 
of recent years. The third main section provides an analysis of policy divergence and 
convergence under devolution, concentrating on broad policy directions and discourses rather 
than specific policy outcomes. Finally, a brief conclusion brings together the key arguments 
of the paper and considers their implications.  
 
Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives 
The experience of state reorganisation over the past three decades has prompted much 
academic debate over its direction, magnitude and consequences. In the early-to-mid 1990s, 
much of the literature focused around the idea of the ‘death’ or demise of the nation state in 
the face of the competing pressures of globalisation and sub-state regionalism (Anderson 
1995). By contrast, recent approaches stress that states are subject to multi-faceted and on-
going processes of qualitative adaptation rather than a simple quantitative diminution of their 
powers (Brenner 2009). Devolution or decentralisation can be seen as one of the most 
widespread forms of restructuring (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2003), helping to convey an 
understanding of the state “as a (political) process in motion” (Peck 2001, 449). Political or 
legislative devolution involves the transfer of powers previously exercised by ministers and 
parliamentary bodies to a subordinate elected body, defined on a geographical basis 
(Bogdanor 1999), although the term is also sometimes also used to refer to the establishment 
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of unelected bodies that operate as part of central government (administrative devolution) 
(Mitchell 2009). 
 
Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall (2008) identify three key forms of devolutionary discourse over the 
past three decades: identity as the discourse advanced by minority groups located in particular 
territories; good governance as the democratic discourse of political reform and self-government; 
and efficiency as the economic discourse of competitiveness and innovation. There is sometimes 
overlap between this economic discourse of efficiency and the neoliberal economic project of 
liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, particularly in their portrayal of central government 
as inefficient and unresponsive (ibid). Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall discern an underlying shift 
over time from a focus on identity to an increasing concern with economic issues, whereby 
decentralisation is seen as a way of reinvigorating regional economies in line with ‘new 
regionalist’ arguments about the renewed importance of regions within an increasingly global 
economy (Keating 1998).  
 
As a key form of state restructuring, devolution involves a rescaling of responsibilities or 
powers from the national to the regional scale of political organisation (Lobao et al. 2009). 
The actual form and politics of such rescaling will vary substantially between states, 
however, amounting to a radical transfer of powers and resources in some cases and a more 
modest and rhetorical shift of responsibility and service delivery in others (Cox 2009; 
Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2003). This underlines the need for researchers to be specific about 
precisely what is being rescaled or devolved in particular contests. In practice, rescaling is not 
a zero-sum or unidirectional process and the increased prominence of regional institutions 
does not necessarily translate into an erosion of the powers of national states (Cox 2009). In 
the context of ‘multilevel governance’, the role of national states has evolved from that of 
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simple governmental provision to the construction and orchestration of governance processes 
across different spatial scales and institutional sites (Lobao et al. 2009). 
 
The capacities of devolved institutions to develop distinctive policies will reflect the 
institutional and financial powers that they have been granted. One key distinction is between 
models of devolution based upon a separation of powers between devolved and national 
government and those in which they share powers. In theory, the separation of powers model 
should generate greater policy divergence since there are fewer constraints on the autonomy 
of devolved governments (Greer 2007). Second, the granting of substantial revenue-raising 
powers through fiscal decentralisation provides a basis for autonomous policy-making and 
policy divergence. By contrast, fiscal transfers between the central state and the provinces or 
regions can be expected to foster commonality and convergence, particularly if the provision 
of resources is accompanied by the stipulation of state-wide policy goals (Jeffery 2007). A 
third key factor is intergovernmental relations and the institutional mechanisms for policy 
coordination between regional and central governments which may be primarily formal or 
informal in nature (Trench 2005). Beyond these institutional factors, other influences can 
affect the dynamics of policy divergence and convergence. Having the same party in power at 
devolved and central levels of government can be expected to encourage convergence, as can 
the existence of interest groups that are organised on a state-wide basis (Keating 2002). 
Public opinion may act as a force for convergence when there is a strong commitment to 
state-wide norms and preferences, whereas marked differences in political values would 
encourage divergence (Jeffery et al. 2010). In addition, the exercising of effective political 
leadership may foster divergence through the establishment of a strategic vision of policy 
innovation and the development of a persuasive political narrative to communicate that 
vision. 
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Devolution raises the issue of equity versus diversity in the sense of reconciling local policy 
choices with broader standards of social justice (Jeffery et al. 2010; Walker 2002). In this 
particular respect, decentralisation or devolution may be supported by neo-liberals for its 
potential to undermine the power of the central state and the collective forms of social 
provision that it embodies (Walker 2002). As such, from a socialist or social democratic 
viewpoint, devolution may seem to threaten wider goals of equity and redistribution, 
notwithstanding the attractions of the ‘good governance’ discourse in term of greater 
participation and accountability. For instance, Walker (2002) is critical of local 
decentralisation because of its potential to foster inequalities in service provision and erode 
social citizenship, potentially inducing a US-style ‘race to the bottom’ through inter-local 
competition (Keating 2009). Recent research suggests, however, that devolved sub-national 
governments often seek to maintain or enhance welfare standards, which may lead to 
emulation in other jurisdictions and policy convergence in a process that is more akin to a 
‘race to the top’ (Jeffery 2011; Keating 2009). 
 
The well-worn characterisation of devolution as a ‘process, not an event’ (Shaw and 
MacKinnon 2011) refers to the tendency for institutional structures and relations to evolve 
and unfold over time, sometimes in unintended or unpredictable ways. In general, this tends 
to operate in the direction of further devolution whereby dissatisfaction with existing 
arrangements fuels demands for additional reform (Giordano and Roller 2004). This trend 
tends to be particularly pronounced in cases such as Spain and the UK in which asymmetrical 
forms of devolution interact with distinctive territorial identities, fostering institutional 
tinkering and region-to-region emulation (Jeffery 2007: 1010). In Spain, asymmetrical 
devolution has generated a process of ‘catch up’ as regions with fewer powers have sought to 
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emulate those with the most devolution. This move towards café para todos (coffee for 
everyone, or the same arrangements for all regions) has provoked protests from the historical 
nationalities who feel that their special status is being eroded (Giordano and Roller, 2004). 
Yet the demands of the latter for greater autonomy have in turn, sparked a conservative 
backlash from Spanish nationalists as is evident from the recent debate over Catalonian 
independence (Wachtel 2012). In the UK, the Scottish model of legislative devolution has 
inspired emulation by Wales, while the electoral success of the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
has enabled the SNP Government to hold a referendum on Scottish independence in 
September 2014. 
 
Devolution and Public Policy in the UK 
Rather than being part of an integrated constitutional vision or blueprint, UK devolution was 
introduced in a piecemeal fashion (see Hazell, 2000). A legacy of administrative devolution 
in the shape of territorially-specific departments of government for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland meant that democratic processes were grafted onto these long-standing 
institutions (Jeffery 2007). The devolved parliaments were granted powers over matters that 
there were not specifically reserved to Westminster (Table 1), and these devolved powers 
were largely based on powers previously exercised by the Scottish, Welsh and Northern 
Ireland offices.
1
 As such, what was being ‘rescaled’ by the UK devolution acts was 
legislative competence over devolved matters and democratic representation and authority 
through the establishment of the devolved parliaments. Basing devolution on the functions 
previously exercised by the territorial departments served to reduce conflict over the 
distribution of powers and resources in the short term, but at the expense of any longer-term 
resolution of territorial imbalances and tensions in the context of a ‘lopsided’ state in which 
England is the dominant partner economically and demographically (Jeffery 2007). While 
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Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own devolved institutions, England is 
governed centrally by the UK parliament, meaning that UK and English political institutions 
have effectively become fused.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
One of the defining characteristics of UK devolution is the fact that the devolved 
administrations have limited raising powers of their own: the Scottish Parliament has the 
power to vary income tax levels in Scotland by +/- 3%, but other than this the only sources of 
revenue open to each administration are local government charges such as the Council Tax 
and non-domestic rates. This contrasts with many other devolved or federal states in which 
the national and sub-national tiers share responsibility for both the raising and distribution of 
revenue. The amount of funding available to them is determined by the Barnett formula, 
introduced in 1978, which awards Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland a population-based 
share of changes in expenditure on comparable services in England (Bell 2010). In theory, 
this formula should result in gradual convergence over time, but this has not happened with 
public spending per head remaining higher in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales (Ball et 
al. 2013). The fact that the level of funding available to the devolved governments reflects 
decisions made at Westminster creates substantial ‘spillover’ effects from England in that the 
effects of these decisions are passed on in the form of increases or decreases to the devolved 
governments block grants (Jeffery 2007). At the same time, however, the block grant 
mechanism allows the devolved governments almost total freedom to allocate funds between 
different policy areas, enabling them to make distinct budget choices (Adams and 
Schmuecker 2005).  
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Compared with other devolved states, the UK model of devolution can be seen as highly 
permissive of policy variation and divergence (Greer 2007; Jeffery 2007). This reflects three 
main institutional features (Jeffery 2007 103). First, the separation of powers between the UK 
parliament and the devolved assemblies means that there are no legislative checks on policy 
divergence, whereas in other devolved states central governments can set state-wide common 
standards to which devolved governments must conform. Second, inter-governmental 
relations are largely informal and ad hoc with an absence of explicit mechanisms to ensure 
coordination (Trench 2005). Third, as outlined above, the block grant mechanism is also 
permissive of policy divergence. Unlike other states, the transfer of funds from the centre is 
not tied to UK-wide policy objectives (Jeffery 2007: 103). This has prompted Greer (2007) to 
highlight the emergence of a ‘fragile divergence machine’, reflecting the interaction between 
this permissive institutional environment and the new forms of territorial politics created by 
devolution. 
 
What might in retrospect be termed the first phase of UK devolution between 1999 and 2007 
was characterised by common Labour Party government at the devolved and UK levels 
(though in coalition with the Liberal Democrats in Scotland from 1999-2007 and in Wales 
from 2000 to 2003), stable inter-government relations and substantial increases in public 
expenditure. In general, Labour Party links also acted as a constraint on policy divergence, 
with the exception of certain high profile initiatives such as free care for the elderly and the 
abolition of up-front tuition fees (Laffin and Shaw 2007). At the same time, the budgets of 
the devolved government rose substantially between 2001/2002 and 2009/2010 (61.5 per cent 
in Scotland, 60 per cent in Wales and 62.6 per cent in Northern Ireland) as a result of 
spending decisions taken by the Labour government in London and channelled through the 
Barnett Formula (HM Treasury 2007; 2011). 
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A new phase of devolution and constitutional politics has become apparent since 2007, 
defined by three distinguishing features (Danson et al. 2012). First, nationalist parties entered 
into government in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast in 2007 as either minority governments or 
coalition partners. This was followed by the SNP’s stunning victory in the Scottish election 
of 2011, enabling it to form a majority government and secure agreement from Westminster 
for a referendum on independence in 2014. By contrast, Labour was able to govern on its 
own in Wales after winning 30 of the 60 seats. 
 
Second, there is the changed context of UK politics following the defeat of Labour in 2010 
and the formation of a Coalition Government between the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats. This highlights the continued political divergence between England and the 
devolved territories, where the Conservatives have continued to perform dismally. 
 
Third, the economic context has changed radically following the financial crisis of 2007-2008 
and the ensuing economic recession. In response, the Coalition government adopted a 
programme of fiscal austerity designed to reduce public expenditure by £81 billion by 2015- 
2016, thereby eliminating the UK’s structural deficit (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012: 23). This 
reduction in public expenditure has been passed on the devolved governments which have 
experienced substantial cuts to their block grants since 2010-11 (Table 2). The welfare state 
has become a particular target of expenditure cuts through the government’s Work 
Programme.  
 
In general, ideological differences between the UK and devolved government have widened 
in the second phase of devolution. At the UK level, austerity is central to the instigation of a 
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new round of ‘roll back’ neo-liberalism (see Peck and Tickell 2002), involving the 
dismantling of ‘alien institutions’ and attacks on public bureaucracies and collective 
entitlements through the “now familiar repertoire of funding cuts, organisational downsizing, 
market testing and privatisation” (Peck 2010, 22). By contrast, the devolved governments 
have reaffirmed their commitment to social justice and solidarity (Scott and Mooney 2009), 
with the Scottish Government, for instance, arguing that the UK Coalition Government’s 
welfare reform agenda clashes threatens the social democratic values of ‘civic Scotland’ 
(McEwen 2013). The devolved governments have also been prominent in calling for 
alternative economic strategies which seek to use public expenditure, particularly increased 
capital spending, to stimulate economic recovery, such as the Scottish Government’s so-
called ‘Plan Mac-B’ (Salmond 2012).2  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Policy Divergence and Convergence in Practice 
I begin this section by distinguishing between ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ dimensions of policy 
divergence and convergence (see Shaw et al. 2009). The horizontal aspect refers to 
differences and similarities between territories, providing the focus of most research on 
devolution and public policy (Jeffery 2002; Greer 2007). In the UK context, some horizontal 
policy variation existed prior to devolution, largely involving the different territorial 
administrations for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland modifying UK-wide policies to suit 
local conditions Mitchell 2009). As Keating (2002, 3) argues: 
“policy divergence under devolution must… be measured not against some abstract 
model of uniformity, but against the pattern of convergence and divergence existing 
in the past.” 
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The vertical dimension, by contrast, pertains to divergence from and convergence with 
previous policies adopted within the same territory (Mitchell 2005). It highlights the temporal 
or longitudinal dimension of policy development, something which remains relatively 
neglected in the literature on devolution and public policy. 
 
In the remainder of this section, I focus on three areas of devolved policy responsibility: 
health, which accounts for the largest share of devolved public expenditure; economic 
development, which is a crucial area of discretionary expenditure in pursuit of growth; and 
social policy which is important in relation to the devolved governments’ approaches to 
social justice.  
 
As Sullivan (2002) observes, some differentiation in health policy existed under the previous 
system of administrative devolution in terms of the adoption of a more partnership-based 
collaborative approach in Scotland and Wales compared to a more consumerist ethos in 
England. Following then Prime Minister’s Tony Blair’s ‘momentous commitment’ to 
increase UK health funding to the European average, spending rose between 2002/3 and 
2007-08 by 55 per cent in England, 48 per cent in Wales, and 45 per cent in both Scotland 
and Northern Ireland (Greer 2010, 144). Subsequently, of course, the fiscal climate has 
changed radically, although health has remained relatively protected from direct funding cuts 
(Centre for Public Policy for Regions undated). 
 
Contrary to expectations of the devolved administrations becoming the loci of policy 
experimentation and reform (Jeffery 2002), in some respects the most radical approach was 
adopted in England in terms of successive governments’ promotion of increased private 
sector involvement in the modernisation of the NHS, while Labour linked the provision of  
13 
 
additional resources in the mid-to-late 2000s to a prescriptive target-based regime for 
monitoring performance (Greer 2003; 2007). Scotland and Wales have maintained more of a 
social democratic approach, resisting market-orientated reforms and emphasising  
professional values, public health, planning and service integration (Greer 2010). As such, the 
English reforms have resulted in both vertical and horizontal policy divergence in terms of 
departing from both previous policies in England prior to devolution (though echoing earlier 
market-orientated reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s) and from the approaches of the 
devolved governments in Scotland and Wales, while vertical convergence is more evident in 
Scotland and Wales through the continuities with previous policies in these jurisdictions. 
Other initiatives have been the result of policies introduced by the devolved governments 
themselves. For instance, the issue of free personal care for the elderly has been one of the 
most high-profile areas of (horizontal and vertical) policy divergence with the Scottish 
Government deciding in 2001 to break with the UK government’s policy by funding full care, 
sparking criticism from Westminster about the perceived costs and political implications of 
this (Laffin and Shaw 2007). Another significant example of policy divergence is provided by 
the Welsh Assembly’s decision to abolish prescription charges which has subsequently been 
adopted by the SNP Government. 
 
Public health provides evidence of greater consistency (Smith and Hellowell 2012). 
Following devolution, health inequalities were identified as a priority in all parts of the UK 
with policy-makers emphasising the need to address wider social and economic determinants 
(Scottish Executive 2000). Over time, however, policy has moved away from this initial 
emphasis to focus increasingly on health services and lifestyle-behaviour (Secretary of State 
for Health 2010; Welsh Assembly Government 2004), though Scotland has returned to the 
emphasis on wider determinants in recent years (Scottish Government 2008a). Probably the 
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most important policy measure introduced under devolution is the ban on smoking in public 
places, which was introduced initially in Scotland in 2006 before being adopted in Northern 
Ireland, Wales and England in 2007 (Cairney 2009). As a result of such policy transfer, what 
began as (horizontal and vertical) policy divergence turned into horizontal policy 
convergence.  
 
While it accounts for a far lower share of public expenditure than health or education, 
economic development is a significant area of devolved policy. Important pre-devolution 
differences existed with Scotland and Wales having regional development agencies, Scottish 
Enterprise, Highland and Islands Enterprise, the Welsh Development Agency and the 
Development Board for Rural Wales, originally established in the 1960s and 1970s. Partly in 
response, Labour sought to address the ‘economic deficit’ of the English regions through the 
establishment of RDAs in the English regions outside London in 1999. More recently, this 
form of horizontal convergence has given way to divergence with the abolition of the English 
RDAs by the incoming Coalition Government in 2010-11 and their replacement with Local 
Enterprise Partnerships, following the earlier abolition of the WDA in 2006 and the 
absorption of its functions into the Welsh Government (Danson and Lloyd 2012). Whilst 
promising a radical ‘control shift’ of responsibilities form central government to local 
communities, LEPs lack resources and powers, with many of the functions of RDAs having 
effectively been re-centralised into Whitehall (Bentley et al. 2010).  
 
In strategic terms, the convergence between the economic development approaches of the 
devolved governments is striking (Adams 2010). They have all favoured the development of 
high value-added, export-orientated business sectors (ibid), speaking the same language of 
competitiveness, innovation and clusters (Adams and Robinson 2005). This marked 
15 
 
horizontal convergence contrasts, however, with significant vertical divergence in terms of 
how the common concern with the promotion of endogenous forms of (knowledge-based) 
development has replaced the previous focus on the attraction of exogenous investment (Pike 
and Tomaney 2009). 
 
The devolved governments have also been active in developing social justice policies 
(Fawcett, 2004). There is a complex scalar division of powers in this area with  Westminster 
retaining responsibility for social security and employment policy through the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP), while the devolved governments are responsible for non-cash 
social services such as health, education, social work, housing, local government and 
training.  
 
In broad terms, the devolved governments have adopted a more traditional social democratic 
language and operated in a more pluralist and consensual fashion in social policy compared 
to the approach of the UK government in England (Birrell 2010; Scottish Government 2008b; 
Welsh Assembly Government 2007). This emphasis on social justice has been particularly 
strong in Scotland and Wales (Scott and Mooney 2009), but less apparent in Northern Ireland 
(Birrell 2010). Divergence in social policy reflects both the introduction of new policies by 
the devolved governments and changes to existing entitlements (Birrell 2010). New policies 
include legislation to introduce minimum alcohol prices in Scotland, the establishment of 
Children’s Commissioners and the establishment of a unified equalities body in Northern 
Ireland. Entitlements have been extended through universal provision, with examples 
including free care for the elderly in Scotland, the abolition of prescription charges in Wales 
and Scotland and free bus travel for older people in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland. In 
some cases, these reforms have resulted in clear horizontal divergence between different 
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devolved territories and between them and England, but in others convergence has taken 
place through policy transfer. Examples of the latter include the Children’s Commissioners 
and free bus travel for older people (ibid, 135). In ‘vertical’ terms, there is a sense in which 
the narrative of social justice and universal provision signals a divergence from the approach 
pursued by UK governments in the 1980s and 1990s which was to reduce entitlements in the 
interests of affordability and tackling welfare ‘dependency’, whilst evoking an older pre-
Thatcher sense of social solidarity (Scott and Mooney 2009).  
 
At the same time, however, an underlying convergence around issues such as social 
exclusion, child poverty and early years provision was also evident, particularly when Labour 
was in power at both levels of government (Birrell 2010; Fawcett 2004). More recently, the 
SNP governments have invoked elements of ‘welfare nationalism’ since 2007, viewing the 
provision of more universal entitlements as characteristic of a more generous social 
democratic approach in Scotland, compared to the neoliberal-inspired reform agenda adopted 
in England (McEwen 2013). This difference has become starker since 2010 as the more 
consensual approaches adopted in Scotland and Wales have collided with the welfare cuts 
and attendant neo-liberal discourse of worklessness and dependency propagated by the 
Coalition Government at Westminster (Wiggan 2012), significantly extending the welfare 
reform agenda previously adopted by both Conservative and Labour governments. SNP 
politicians have attempted to harness and exploit this divergence in the run up to the 2014 
referendum, criticising “heartless Tory welfare reforms” and arguing that independence will 
provide Scotland with the tools to tackle poverty and deprivation (Sturgeon 2012), although 
some critics have questioned the costs of this in the context of independence (McEwen 2013). 
  
 
17 
 
Conclusions 
Devolution in the UK was based on a substantial legacy of administrative devolution, making 
it deceptively straightforward by enabling the UK Labour government of the time to 
effectively graft the new arrangements onto existing institutions (Jeffery 2007). This meant 
that the UK state was able to resist pressures for a more radical re-balancing and rescaling of 
its underlying power-geometry (Amin et al. 2003). As such, devolution to the 'Celtic fringe’ 
has not been accompanied by any corresponding modernisation of the UK’s (famously 
unwritten) constitution, resulting in the perpetuation of established arrangements and 
institutional forms (Nairn 2000). At the same time, as I have argued in this paper, devolution 
has significantly altered the institutional landscape of public policy in the UK. It has 
generated some high-profile examples of policy divergence resulting from decisions made by 
the devolved governments such as free care for the elderly and the abolition of tuition fees in 
Scotland and the smoking bans. In addition, the devolved governments have also opted not to 
introduce reforms adopted in England. This second form of divergence has assumed a distinct 
political direction whereby the Scottish and Welsh Governments have rejected market-
orientated reforms and prescriptive performance regimes, preferring to develop more 
collaborative social democratic approaches (Birrell 2010; Greer 2003). There is also evidence 
of policy convergence, reflecting constitutional constraints and limitations, party links and 
affiliations between governments prior to 2007 and 2010, public opinion, and the limited 
ability of the devolved government to raise their own revenues. More recently, the devolved 
governments have criticised the austerity programme and welfare reforms introduced by the 
Westminster Coalition government, and emphasised the need for an economic ‘plan (Mac) B’ 
(Salmond 2012), although they have been forced by the existing structure of devolution to 
manage budget cuts.  
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The passage of time has underlined the nature of UK devolution as an unfolding process 
rather than a one-off event (Shaw and MacKinnon 2011). Economic and political conditions 
have changed markedly since the establishment of the institutions in 1999, particularly in 
terms of changes of government at devolved and Westminster levels, the onset of recession 
from 2008 and the introduction of a new politics of austerity. The underlying asymmetries of 
UK devolution have become more pronounced with the tendency towards greater autonomy 
for Scotland and Wales contrasting with greater centralisation and the abolition of regional 
institutions in England. The UK is an increasingly lopsided state in which England is the 
dominant partner demographically and economically, but the only part to be governed 
centrally by the UK Parliament (Jeffery 2007). These contradictions raise some fundamental 
questions about the territorial integrity of the state and the possible break-up of Britain (Nairn 
1977) in the context of the Scottish independence referendum. The UK government’s refusal 
to countenance any notion of devolution ‘plus’ or ‘max’, which would have required some re-
balancing of the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK, thereby polarising the 
issue between full independence and the status quo, points to an continuing opposition among 
leading Westminster politicians and opinion-formers to any prospect of state-wide 
constitutional modernisation or renewal (Jeffery 2007) (as well as their desire for a decisive 
victory over Scottish nationalism). This attachment to existing state institutions and practices 
is likely to be further reinforced by a No vote in the referendum, while a victory for the Yes 
campaign will usher in a protracted process of negotiation over the terms of independence, 
although much may depend on the precise margins of the vote.  
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Notes
                                                 
1
 In the case of Northern Ireland, there are three types of powers: devolved, exempted (the equivalent of the 
powers reserved to Westminster in the cases of Scotland and Wales) and reserved powers which cover matters 
such as security and policing, foreign trade, economic regulation and consumer protection, among others, which 
will be devolved once the Assembly demonstrates its competence to discharge these duties responsibly.   
2
 Furthermore, there is evidence of radical thinking on alternative economic and social futures emerging within 
the devolved nations such as the Jimmy Reid Foundation’s vision of an independent Scotland as an ‘common 
weal’ based on Nordic-style social democratic values. 
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Table 3.1 Reserved and Devolved Matters: Scotland and Wales.  
Reserved Matters Devolved Matters 
International relations Health 
Defence and national security Education and training 
Fiscal and monetary policy Local government  
Immigration and nationality Social work 
The criminal law in relation to drugs and 
firearms 
Housing  
Laws on companies and business 
associations, regulation of financial 
institutions and services 
Planning  
Competition, monopolies and mergers Economic development  
Most consumer protection; data protection Transport 
Elections, except local elections  
Post Office, postal and telegraphy services The Administration of European Structural 
Funds 
Most energy matters The law and home affairs 
Transport safety and regulation; air transport The environment 
Social security Agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
Research Councils Sport and the arts 
Designation of Assisted areas Research and statistics in relation to devolved 
matters 
Broadcasting and film classification  
Abortion, human fertilisation and 
embryology 
 
Equality legislation  
Source: MacKinnon et al. 2008: 43; amended from Keating, 2002: 16-19. 
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Table 1 Planned Budget Allocations to the Devolved Governments 
Department 2010-11 
£ billion 
2011-12 
£ billion 
2012-13 
£ billion 
2013-14 
£ billion 
2014-15 
£ billion 
Scotland      
Resource 
Department 
Expenditure 
Limit (DEL) 
24.8 24.8 25.1 25.3 25.4 
Capital DEL 3.4 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.3 
Total DEL 28.2 27.3 27.6 27.5 27.7 
Real DEL cut 
relative to 
2010-11 
- -5.6 -6.6 -9.4 -11.1 
Wales       
Resource 
DEL 
13.3 13.3 13.3 13.5 13.5 
Capital DEL 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 
Total DEL 15.0 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.6 
Real DEL cut 
relative to 
2010-11 
- 5.7% -7.7% -10.1% -11.9% 
Northern 
Ireland 
     
Resource 
DEL 
9.3 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.5 
Capital DEL 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
Total DEL 10.5 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 
Real DEL cut 
relative to 
2010-11 
- -4.3% -6.4% -8.8% -11.2% 
Source: Brewer et al. 2001: 145 (analysis based on UK Government Spending Review 2010) 
